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SUBJECT		Asti-Wilitary Apparat of the Mambo Regional		

dition of the Lao Dong Farty in South Vietnam

1. Attached for your information are copies of a short study titled The Anti-Hilitary Asserts of the Newbo Regional Committee of the Leo Dong Party in South Victors.

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2. During the past few years there has been an extensive intensification of efforts by non-bloc (P's to develop their capabilities for the subvarsion and penetration of armed forces. In the case of some Communist parties this effort has not progressed beyond a rudimentary organizational stage. In others, well-developed covert anti-military organizations have some into being, or existing apparats have been reorganized or expanded. The intensification of anti-military work is considered by the Communists to be as important in those areas where a so-called 'peaceful' seisure of power in being prepared as in those where an armed struggle is underway or anticipated.

- 3. The attached study describes the penetration and propaganda activities of the anti-military apparat (known as the <u>Minh Van</u>) of the Lao Dong (Vietnamese Communist) Party in South Vietnam. While in this instance the apparat belongs to a clandestine party engaged in a combined military and political struggle, the mission of the <u>Minh Van</u> is essentially the same as that of the most embryonic anti-military organization in the most respectable of CPs; subversion and penetration of the armed forces.
- 4. This study depicts the structure, mission and methods of operation of one highly developed anti-military organization; it also strives to show the relationship between that organization and the other illegal activities of the CP, political or otherwise, including the relationship to the party's guerrilla forces and their operations. Even though the study is concerned with a highly developed apparat, certain patterns emerge which may be of importance in assessing anti-military organizations in other CPs. As examples, the following stand out:
 - (1) There is an intimate relationship between the antimilitary apparat and the intelligence organization of the party (both are controlled by the same party functionary).
 - (2) There is a similar intimate relationship, at least at the highest echelons, between both these apparats and the technical organization of the party.
 - (3) There is a clear separation of the paramilitary guidance function from the anti-military apparat below the highest level of the party.
 - (4) The structure of the operating units of the antimilitary apparat is geared to the structure of the military forces which constitute their target.

It is obvious, of course, that not all of these patterns will necessarily repeat themselves in any particular Communist party.

5. This study, which in draft form carried a classification, has been down-graied to country.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

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Attachment(s): 1

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